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Abstract
Various schemes have been proposed to achieve strong
authentication of streamed data in a lossy network by means
of “light” digital signatures. Such techniques perform a
strong authentication on only one packet, to which oth-
ers are linked by means of hash functions, so that the
authentication property propagates to them too. Most of
these schemes make the basic assumption that the signature
packet is not lost, even if no practical and precise solutions
are proposed that guarantee such a property. In this paper
we show how adoption of some redundancy techniques can
be used in the context of multicast stream authentication in
order to increase probability that the signature packets are
received and correctly verified against their digital signa-
ture. Finally some experimental results are presented com-
paring computational overheads due to the authentication
schemes both at the sender and at the receiver.
This work has been funded by the FABRIC project in the
context of the IST Programme of the EU 5th Framework.
Keywords Multicast stream authentication, forward error
correction, digital signatures.
1. Introduction
The problem of authenticating digital streams has re-
cently gained more and more importance in the context of
multicast transmissions. In fact multicast channels are the
main means of delivery of data from a single sender to many
receivers or among a group of users. In a multicast set-
ting, the establishment of a group session key allows pri-
vacy of the exchanged data and group authentication, that
is each received packet is guaranteed to come from the user
group. It does not achieve, though, sender authentication,
concerned with the assurance that the data comes from the
claimed sender, and non repudiation, guaranteeing that the
sender cannot deny, at a later moment, to have sent the data.
In those applications that have such requirements, like se-
cure delivery of software updates or stock quotes, additional
security algorithms must be run to guarantee them.
Basically all of the proposed approaches in the literature
make use of digital signature schemes to guarantee these
security properties. The main problem with adoption of
digital signature technology is the high computational over-
head due to the complex arithmetics behind today’s signa-
ture primitives, and the high bandwidth overhead due to the
length of a single signature. The computational overhead is
a concern especially when transmitters and receivers need to
be dedicated, low-cost and low-consumption, dedicated de-
vices. Furthermore, when signing multicast transmissions,
many factors must be taken into account, like scalability of
the scheme with respect to the size of the multicast group or
the usual absence of an upstream channel to return feedback
to the sender.
Various schemes have been proposed using “light” digi-
tal signature schemes that mainly allow less computational
overheads both at the sender and at the receiver sides.
Some of these schemes make use of one time digital sig-
natures based on symmetric cryptographic techniques, but
this makes impossible to guarantee non repudiation of trans-
mitted data. Other schemes use classic digital signatures
based on asymmetric cryptography to authenticate a group
of consecutive packets with a single signature, alleviating
bandwidth and computational overheads both at the sender
and at the receiver. Typically in these approaches a graph
of hashes is built on the packet group, where a packet is au-
thenticated at the receiver if and only if the received packets
include an oriented path from the packet to the signature. In
these works usually there is the assumption that the signa-
ture packet is correctly received during transmission, and a
little effort has been made to show how this assumption can
be validated. Furthermore,performance data on the authen-
tication schemes not always include the additional overhead
needed for the preservation of such a property on the signa-
ture packet.
In this paper we explicitly analyze how redundancy tech-
niques can be used in digital stream authentication schemes
in order to both guarantee verifiability of the received traffic
in presence of an unreliable media and to increase proba-
bility that the single signature authenticating a sequence of
packets is delivered to the receivers. Furthermore, a proto-
type of an authenticated multimedia stream server has been
implemented in order to gather experimental results about
the overall performance impact due to the adoption of these
techniques in multicast stream dissemination. The results
shown in this paper must be added to the ones pertaining to
specific authentication schemes in order to achieve an exact
measure of the total overhead due to secure authentication
of a digital stream.
1.1. Document structure
The remain of this paper is organized as follows: in sec-
tion 2 we make a brief survey on multicast strong authen-
tication schemes existing in literature. In section 3.1 we
show how general data redundancy techniques can be used
to validate the property of correct signature packet delivery
for hash chaining based authentication schemes. In section
3 we make a comparison on the performance of some au-
thentication schemes, based on experimental results gath-
ered through prototype implementations. Finally, conclu-
sions are presented in section 4.
2. State of the art
In this section we briefly discuss various methods that
have been proposed in last years for providing strong au-
thentication of streams over lossy networks. The discus-
sion is limited to schemes achieving non repudiation of the
transmitted data. A simple authentication scheme consists
of independently signing each packet of the stream and by
including in each packet its digital signature. This scheme
suffers of a high computational overhead both at the sender
and at the receiver. This is due to the expensiveness of
both the sign and the verify operations with current asym-
metric cryptographic primitives. Furthermore this scheme
achieves a high bandwidth overhead due to the length of
usual digital signatures1.
In many single-sender multi-receiver applications, com-
putational overhead at the sender side is not of great im-
portance, as the sending host can be properly designed to
overcome it. Often these applications have much more strict
requirements on the receiver side, where low-cost dedicated
devices or general purpose home computers must be able to
receive and verify the traffic in real time. So many works
exist in literature proposing alternative signature schemes
with the property of being much less computational expen-
sive, at least for the verify operation.
1For a 1024 bit RSA signature, 128 bytes are needed for authenticating
each packet
These schemes try to reduce the number of signatures
to be performed for a multicast transmission, by allowing a
single signature to verify multiple packets at the same time.
In this category we have the simple approach in [2], where
a single classic digital signature is calculated on the first
packet and each packet contains a hash of the next one. This
way the authentication performed by the first signature is
propagated to the overall stream by means of hash chaining,
given that a collision resistant hash function is used. This
approach is only suitable when the entire stream is known
in advance to the sender and does not tolerate packet losses,
as once the chain has been broken due to a lost packet, it
is not possible for the receiver to authenticate subsequent
received packets anymore.
The general idea of propagating the authentication prop-
erty by means of authentication chains has been widely in-
vestigated and used in the literature in further, more sophis-
ticated, schemes that solved the main drawbacks just cited.
In [11] a remarkable work has been made for tolerating ar-
bitrary loss patterns on received packets, by means of two
approaches. In the star-chaining technique a group of con-
secutive packets is signed, then the digital signature is in-
cluded in each transmitted packet, along with the hashes of
all the other packets of the group. This way each packet
can be verified independently of the others in the group.
The main drawback of this method is the quadratic band-
width overhead with respect to the number of packets in
the group. In the more sophisticated approach, the tree-
chaining technique, a balanced tree of hashes is built, where
the leafs of the tree are the hash values of the packets per-
taining to a group. Each intermediate node, instead, con-
tains a combination of the hashes of its child nodes. In
this case only the root node’s hash is digitally signed and
included in each transmitted packet, along with the values
corresponding to the sibling nodes along the path from the
packet to the root. This approach achieves a    loga-
rithmic bandwidth overhead with respect to the sub-stream
size, while receiver overhead is still the one of a single sig-
nature verification and a linear number of hash computa-
tions and comparisons.
A generalization of the simple hash-chaining method has
been introduced by Golle and Modadugu in [3], where an
optimal solution is presented with respect to available mem-
ory resources at the sender and receiver side, in the case of
network with losses occurring in bursts. Tolerating burst
losses instead of random ones seems to be appropriate for
the Internet, as shown by Paxson in [16]. In the Golle con-
struction a complex oriented graph is built, with each edge
from a packet to another meaning that the second one in-
cludes a hash of the first one. The graph construction starts
from an extended chain where each node is connected to the
subsequent one, and to the 
	 subsequent one, for a fixed
integer  . Then a method is introduced to insert, between
each subsequent two nodes of the chain,  further nodes.
The final construction is somewhat complex and is built in
a recursive way. The authors prove resistance of the con-
struction to bursty losses of length at most  , and its
optimality with respect to resources available at the sender
and receiver in terms of number of available packet and hash
buffers. In this scheme, a packet is authenticated as long
as the received packets include an oriented path from the
packet itself to the digital signature packet, that needs to be
correctly delivered. This last assumption is made through-
out all the paper, but only a few hints are given on how to
validate it, like multiple retransmissions, while it has not
been specified how this would impact the presented perfor-
mance data.
Another authentication scheme is Efficient Multichained
Stream Signature (EMSS) proposed by Perrig et al. in [5].
Using a combination of one-way hash functions and sig-
natures, authentication is obtained by storing the hashes of
each packet in multiple locations. Each packet contains a
fixed number of hashes from other packets. At the sender
side, the actual hashes contained in each packet are calcu-
lated at random. The final packet contains the digital signa-
ture relative to the group and the hashes of a few last pre-
ceding packets. The authors propose to send the signature
packet more times in order to guarantee its correct delivery.
Similarly to EMSS, the Augmented Chain [3] uses one-
way hash functions and signatures that are periodically sent
in the stream. The chain is constructed in two steps: the first
one is very similar to EMSS: each hash packet of external
chain is stored in the next packet and in the 	 following
packet, with a fixed parameter  . In the second step,  pack-
ets are inserted in the original chain and its hashes are stored
in recursive way storing hashes of packet  as in previous
packets as in subsequent. We sign last packet in the group.
This scheme can tolerates burst of ﬀﬁﬂ packets.
A further scheme is Piggy Backing, introduced in [8].
Main aim of this scheme is the ability to tolerate multiple
bursts of a fixed maximum size. In this scheme the group
is partitioned in subgroups of packets, called classes. Only
the packets in the first class contain hashes: The packets
of higher priority classes are spaced by a fixed number of
packet from lower priority classes. The first packet in ﬃ  is
signed.
A novel approach has been introduced by Park et al. [13],
by adopting Rabin’s Information Dispersal Algorithm to
construct an authentication scheme that amortizes a group
authentication data over all the groups packets. In this ap-
proach the packet hashes and the digital signature authen-
ticating the entire group are concatenated, then a redun-
dancy technique is applied on the resulting authentication
data in order to split it into pieces through the group pack-
ets. If at least a prefixed number ! among the   sent
packets are received, then the receiver has enough infor-
mation to reconstruct the entire group authentication data,
and authenticate the received packets, as well as the remain-
ing packets of the group that will be received. In the pro-
posed approach, a space-optimal redundancy technique [12]
is adopted when splitting the authentication data, making
use of Galois Fields in "# ( $&%ﬁ'"(#) ). The authors also ob-
serve how their construction is highly tolerant to both ran-
dom and burst loss patterns even in case of high network
losses. As we will observe later, the only drawback is on
the computational side, where the redundancy technique re-
quires higher resources on the receiver than the graph chain-
ing based approaches do.
Another drawback of this scheme is that it is highly vul-
nerable to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, as evidenced
by the same authors in [14]. This happens because the re-
ceiver, in case of malicious introduction in the stream of
bogus packets, has no immediate way for discarding them.
Only after receive of ! packets, and a FEC decoding com-
putation, the receiver detects a failure in the reconstruc-
tion of the authentication data. In the same paper, var-
ious techniques are proposed to face with this problem,
based upon cryptographic fingerprinting techniques, that al-
low the receiver to immediately distinguish among original
and maliciously introduced packets. An alternative tech-
nique for facing with DoS attacks is introduced by Pannetrat
et al. [15], who propose sending FEC encoded authentica-
tion data relative to a packet group along with the previous
packet group.
In the following table, we summarize main properties
of the introduced authentication schemes. Specifically, for
each of scheme we report the loss patterns the scheme is
resistant to, the delay introduced at the sender and receiver
sides, measured in number of packets.
Augmented Chain
resistance to loss burst of max len *ﬁ+,
sender delay 
receiver delay "  
Piggy Backing
resist. to loss (for class - ) .  bursts of max size /
sender delay  
receiver delay  
EMSS
resistance to loss variable
sender delay 
receiver delay "  
SAIDA
resistance to loss at most   0! out of  
sender delay  
receiver delay  
3. Results
3.1. Guaranteeing delivery of signature
A possibility in guaranteeing correct delivery of the dig-
ital signature packet in hash chaining based authentication
schemes, usually a simple retransmission has been proposed
by authors. An alternative solution could be adopting a FEC
encoding scheme for this purpose, like the erasure codes
presented in [12]. Figures 1 and 2 report theoretical proba-
bility of correct delivery of the signature packet versus the
required bandwidth overhead in both cases, at varying sin-
gle packet loss rates. In both figures only marked points
correspond to feasible overhead- probability pairs, though
points corresponding to a same loss rate have been con-
nected with lines to facilitate picture reading.
Figures highlight how the FEC based approach allows a
much finer granularity in choosing the bandwidth overhead,
and that even at low overheads, it reaches higher probability
of correct packet delivery, provided that a minimum tresh-
old overhead is used.
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Figure 1. Theoretical overhead vs. target delivery proba-
bility with multiple repetitions
3.2. Error Model
A two states, discrete time, Markov Chain has been used
to model packet losses during experimentations. Accord-
ing to this model, the communication among the sender and
each receiver behaves like a state machine that stops pack-
ets when in a state, and lets them through when in the other
state. This model produces bursty packet losses, that is ap-
propriate [7] for a number of multimedia network stream-
ing applications. Parameters characterizing the MC are the
probability of transition from the normal state to the stop-
ping state, and vice versa. These parameters affect the re-
sulting bursty loss patterns. For the purposes of our experi-
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Figure 2. Theoretical overhead vs. target delivery proba-
bility with erasure codes
mentation, parameters have been set up so to fix the medium
burst length to eight packets, while the loss rate has been
varied.
3.3. Experiment set up
Common parameters
Group size 128 packets
Packet size 1000 bytes
Signature type 1024 bit RSA
Hash type MD5 (16 bytes)
Medium burst len 8 pkts
Loss rate 5%,10%,20%
EMSS
Signatures repetitions 0,1,2,3,4
# of hashes in signature 30, 55, 70, 90
Hashes per packet 2, 4, 6
Augmented Chain
Number of sent signatures 0,1,2,3,4
 parameter 4,8,16
 parameter 2,4,6
SAIDA
! parameter 32 40 64 70 80 90 100
Piggy Backing
/ parameter 8, 12, 16, 15
Classes 2, 6, 4, 8, 12, 15
Subsequent bursts 1 2 4 6 8
Four authentication schemes have been compared by
measuring their performance in a prototype implementation
of a multicast stream server. Experiments have been con-
ducted on a 2GHz Athlon processor with FreeBSD operat-
ing system.
The considered schemes are: EMSS, PiggyBacking,
Augmented Chain and SAIDA. Considered parameters for
the schemes are summarized in the table.
In the first three schemes, in order to guarantee deliv-
ery of the signature packet in a lossy environment, it has
been transmitted multiple times. Subsequent retransmis-
sions have been distanced in order to avoid their overall loss
within a single burst.
3.4. Results
We compared computational overheads due to the au-
thentication of the stream in the four schemes, both at the
sender and at the receiver sides. In order to tune up param-
eters for each scheme, we have performed multiple runs at
a fixed loss rate. Only those runs achieving an authentica-
tion probability greater than 90% have been considered in
the final reports. For each of these cases, we measured the
amount of time required by the receiver to decode a single
group. Only the time spent in authentication related opera-
tions, like signature verification and hash comparisons, has
been measured.
Figures 3, 4 and 5 report the encoding times experi-
mented to catch up authentication probabilities greater than
90%, for various loss rates. For parameters resulting in a
similar authentication probability, only those achieving the
least bandwidth overhead have been reported in the picture.
As the figures show, Augmented Chain and EMSS have
the smallest encoding times. SAIDA needs a higher encod-
ing time due to the FEC encoding algorithm. The highest
encoding time is obtained for the Piggy Backing scheme.
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Figure 3. Encoding time vs. achieved authentication
probability for a 5% loss rate
Figures 6, 7 and 8 report the decoding times obtained at
the receiver in the same cases as for the figures relative to
the encoding times.
As the figures highlight, the PiggyBacking, Augmented
Chain and EMSS receivers need similar computational
time. In fact these schemes all rely on hash calculations
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Figure 4. Encoding time vs. achieved authentication
probability for a 10% loss rate
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Figure 5. Encoding time vs. achieved authentication
probability for a 20% loss rate
and comparisons on the receiver. The SAIDA scheme is
more expensive because of FEC decoding operations on the
receiver. We must note that the adopted FEC algorithm is
a systematic erasure code. So, depending on the actual loss
pattern, the experimented decoding time at the receiver has
great variations. The best case situation is achieved when
all first ! packets arrive. In this case, no operations are re-
quired to rebuild the authentication data. In the worst case
scenario, instead, all first ! packets get lost, so, in order
to rebuild the authentication data, the receiver must solve a
!1.2! linear system.
Compared with other schemes, SAIDA needs more CPU
resources, but the lower bandwidth overhead makes this
protocol very promising. Furthermore, among the analyzed
schemes, this is one of the simplest one from a point of view
of parameter tuning.
Figures 9, 10 and 11 report the needed overhead on the
communication due to the adoption of the analyzed authen-
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Figure 6. Decoding time vs. achieved authentication
probability for a 5% loss rate
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Figure 7. Decoding time vs. achieved authentication
probability for a 10% loss rate
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Figure 8. Decoding time vs. achieved authentication
probability for a 20% loss rate
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Figure 9. Group overhead vs. achieved authentication
probability for a 5% loss rate
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Figure 10. Group overhead vs. achieved authentication
probability for a 10% loss rate
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Figure 11. Group overhead vs. achieved authentication
probability for a 20% loss rate
tication schemes. The overhead is basically due to the addi-
tion of hashes and digital signature information to the origi-
nal packets. Furthermore the retransmission of the digital
signature packet for the EMSS, PiggyBacking and Aug-
mented Chain schemes has been accounted for the final
overhead computation, in the exposed results.
As figures show, the SAIDA algorithm requires lower
bandwidth overhead than the other algorithms for a target
authentication probability.
4. Conclusions
In this paper we made a performance comparison on
resource requirements of various multicast authentication
schemes. Our attention has been focused on schemes
achieving sender authentication and non repudiation in the
transmission. The compared schemes are EMSS, Aug-
mented Chain, Piggy Backing and SAIDA. The first three
schemes try to preserve authentication data (i.e. packet
hashes) by means of their repetition and multiple inclu-
sion in different packets, while the SAIDA algorithm re-
lies on a general redundancy technique for equally distribut-
ing the authentication data among packets which it refers
to. Gathered performance data highlight that, in spite of
a better resistance to packet losses, that is highlighted by a
less bandwidth overhead for a same authentication probabil-
ity, SAIDA presents a higher authentication computational
overhead at the receiver.
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